Understanding Perceptions of Armed Resistance Through Postcolonial Theory

This article uses postcolonial theory to examine why armed resistance by colonised peoples, particularly Palestinians, is framed as terrorism while state violence by Western-aligned powers is legitimised. Drawing on Fanon and Said, it exposes how colonial power, media narratives, and Orientalist assumptions shape global perceptions of violence, resistance, and legitimacy.

Sher Khalid-Ali

1/27/202612 min read

Introduction

The current ongoing Israeli assault on Gaza has emerged as one of the most contentious issues of the last decade. With unprecedented levels of destruction, a complete collapse of essential infrastructure in Gaza, and over seventy-eight thousand Palestinians estimated to have been killed since October 7th, 2023 (MPG, 2025).

The current assault has renewed global debates around occupation, state violence and the selective application of international law. Central to this crisis is not only the material asymmetry between Palestinian and Israeli actors but also the discursive asymmetry through which their actions are understood by the international community. Whilst Israel’s military operations are routinely framed by Western governments as self-defence, Palestinian armed resistance, specifically that carried out by Hamas, is overwhelmingly labelled as terrorism. This disparity has profound consequences because it shapes political discourse, influences access to humanitarian protection for Palestinian civilians, and reinforces long standing hierarchies of who has a legitimate right to self-defence, and who does not.

This paper will argue that these framings are not simply a neutral assessment of violence but are in fact rooted in colonial logics which continue to influence contemporary international relations. By examining the international response to both actors, this essay will argue that the framing of Palestinian armed resistance as terrorism, is in itself, a colonial tool used to delegitimise the pursuit of Palestinian self-determination. In contrast, the routine acceptance of Israeli state violence as legitimate acts of self-defence reflects a broader international tendency to extend moral and political credibility to Western colonisers whilst attempting to normalise their actions through international discourse.

Background

The current assault in Gaza is most accurately understood within the context of a broad history of violent settler colonialism
(Dana & Jarbawi, 2017). Since its establishment in 1948, Israel has pursued colonial policies intended to expand
its territorial control over historic Palestine and forcibly displace its indigenous inhabitants through extreme violence
(Pappe, 2007 pp.13-15). Despite Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza in 2005, the territory remains legally classified as occupied,
due to continued Israeli control of its airspace, territorial waters, borders, and the movement of goods and people
(Jaber & Bantekas 2023).

On October 7, 2023, the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), alongside other Palestinian factions, launched an unprecedented attack into Israeli territory. The attack was predominantly carried out by militants entering Israel aided by a barrage of approximately three thousand rockets fired from within Gaza (Fraihat & Hedaya, 2024). The attack resulted in around 1200 Israelis losing their lives (The Jerusalem Post, 2023) and the taking of between 200 and 250 captives back to Gaza as hostages (Al Jazeera, 2023).

In response, Israel imposed a comprehensive siege on Gaza, halting the entry of humanitarian aid such as food, water, and medical supplies, blocking fuel shipments, and disconnecting the territory from its mains electricity supply (Fraihat & Hedaya, 2024). Furthermore, the Israeli air force began a mass bombardment of the Gaza Strip resulting in the destruction of approximately seventy percent of homes within the territory (The Economic Times, 2023), as well as the destruction of schools, mosques, hospitals and other vital infrastructure. At the time of writing this essay, conservative estimates suggest over 70,000 Palestinians have been killed (NBC, 2025).

This essay will analyse specifically the international response to both the Palestinian resistance and the Israeli state, to examine whether the designation of resistance as terrorism is an analytical or ideological tool.

Postcolonialism & its Key Concepts

This essay will adopt a postcolonial theoretical framework to examine the international reaction to both Palestinian and Israeli actors and to analyse why Palestinian armed resistance is often framed as terrorism by the Western international community, whilst the violent actions of Israel which are demonstrably more destructive, are framed as legitimate actions taken in self-defence. Postcolonialism has been chosen as the theoretical framework to understand this issue for the following reasons: firstly, the work of Fanon (1963) which explores both the framing of colonised people as “insensible to ethics” (Fanon, 1963. p.32) an idea which is entrenched and perpetuated in modern understandings of Palestinian resistance; and the idea that decolonisation is naturally a violent phenomenon (Fanon, 1963) which lends critical insight to the modern framing of anticolonial struggle as terrorism.

Secondly due to the work of Said (1979) whose work on perceptions of the Orient is fundamental to understanding the disparity in interpretations of Palestinian actors.

Thirdly, due to the work of Cesaire (2000) who argued that European populations had normalised Nazism “because, until then, it had been applied only to non-European peoples” (Cesaire, 2000. p.28). Cesaire’s (2000) understanding of the Western world’s reaction to violence being dependent on whether its victims are Western or not, is fundamental to understanding international responses to this crisis. Especially when we consider that despite 2023 being the “deadliest year on record for children in the occupied West Bank” (Save the Children, 2023) prior to the October 7th attack, there was very little international attention on Palestine, until 1200 Israelis were killed on Oct 7th (Jerusalem Post, 2023). This demonstrates a disparity in response to violence based solely on the victims’ ethnicity or their status as either occupied or occupier, which is a phenomenon only explainable by postcolonial theory. Finally, whilst the study of international interpretations of Palestinian and Israeli actors could be viewed through a constructivist lens from the perspective of maintaining international norms and values, this essay will seek to highlight that the norms and values which underpin our international system, are conveniently forgotten when the victims are non-Western, indigenous people, a concept which is heavily supported by postcolonial theory.

Fanon & The Politics of Resistance

Fanon (1963) argued that colonialism is “violence in its natural state, and it will only yield when confronted with greater violence.” (Fanon, 1963. p.61). What Fanon (1963) is arguing here is the idea that liberation from occupation does not come from diplomatic process but from necessary armed struggle. This is because, according to Fanon (1963), decolonisation is the “meeting of two forces, opposed to each other by their very nature” (Fanon, 1963. Pp.27-28). The relationship between coloniser and colonised is not one of parity, equality or fairness but one of subjugation, oppression and violence; therefore, by its very nature, decolonisation cannot be an amicable process because it is the undoing of a profoundly unjust pattern of behaviours. The idea that decolonisation is inherently violent, unfortunately plays into the colonial stereotype of colonised people being “insensible to ethics” (Fanon, 1963. p.32), or in other words, incapable of engaging in diplomatic means of liberation. These concepts are fundamental in understanding the issue of decolonisation in Palestine because to understand the complexity of the current situation, one must understand how diplomatic process has long failed the Palestinian people and left little room for political solutions which do not involve struggle or violence.

Immediately after the establishment of Israel in 1948, a UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution was passed affirming the right of return for Palestinian refugees after a violent campaign of ethnic cleansing saw the forced displacement of approximately 800,000 Palestinians from 531 villages and 11 urban neighbourhoods, in what has since been termed The Nakba (Pappe, 2007 p.15). Despite resolution 194 calling for the right to return for Palestinian refugees (UN, 1948) Israel has, until the modern day, prevented the return of indigenous peoples to their homes. In 1967, the UN Security Council (UNSC) unanimously adopted resolution 242 (1967), which rejected the legitimacy of “acquisition of territory by war” (UN, 1967) and deemed the presence of Israeli forces within the Occupied Palestinian Territories to be illegal. This was followed by UNGA resolutions 2253 (ES-V) and 2254 (ES-V) which condemned Israeli annexation of Jerusalem and called on Israel to rescind its actions and refrain from altering the city’s status, also acknowledging its failure to comply with previous resolutions to withdraw from the Occupied Palestinian Territories (UN Docs, 1967). In 1968, a further UNSC resolution (252, 1968) was passed noting that Israel had taken further measures in contravention of previous rulings and affirming that any attempts to change the legal status of Jerusalem were invalid (UN, 1968). In 1979, yet another UNSC resolution was passed which:

Strongly deplores the failure of Israel to abide by Security Council resolutions 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967, 252 (1968) of 21 May 1968 and 298 (1971) of 25 September 1971. (UN, 1979 p.1).

As illustrated here, since its establishment, Israel has continuously failed to comply with UNSC or UNGA resolutions and has faced only verbal condemnation from the international community. Comparing the extreme violence of the Nakba (Pappe, 2007) with the diplomatic response witnessed in the UN is a fine illustration of Fanon’s (1963) argument that diplomatic process without violent resistance, does not lead to decolonisation. Meeting extreme violence with diplomatic responses has only resulted in the continued expansion of Israeli settlements, the continued oppression of Palestinian natives and the impunity with which Israel continues to act in the present day. Israel has successfully managed to retain the support of Western governments, despite its non-compliance with significant international liberal institutions. In contrast, whilst Israel has accumulated a long and well documented history of defying UNSC and UNGA resolutions, it is Palestinian resistance factions that are disproportionately demonised by the international community and stripped of political legitimacy.

This cements the role of postcolonial theory in understanding this crisis by highlighting the disparity in reaction to the actions of Hamas on October 7th with the international response to repeated failures of the Israeli state to comply with UNSC and UNGA resolutions. In both cases, extreme violence resulted from both acts of colonisation and acts of resistance, yet the international response to October 7th was one of extreme condemnation which in turn, legitimised Israel’s actions in Gaza as a “war of defence against Hamas” (UN News, 2024). The fact that Israel’s actions in Gaza are viewed by the international community within the context of the actions of October 7th, yet the actions of Hamas on that day are not viewed in the context of decades of violent colonisation, is an extension of the colonial hierarchies exposed by postcolonial scholars such as Fanon (1963) which define the colonised as barbaric and their Western colonisers as legitimate political actors.

Furthermore, the international expectation on Palestinians not to engage in violent struggle highlights Fanon’s (1963) argument that “during the period of decolonisation, the native’s reason is appealed to” (Fanon, 1963. p.33). The way in which the international community expects colonised people to engage with the structures which undoubtedly legitimise their oppression, whilst simultaneously expecting them to respond to violent colonisation with a non-violent struggle, can only be explained by the international hierarchy exposed by postcolonial theory.

Orientalism and Palestine

The work of Said (1979) is also fundamental to understanding key issues which are linked to the colonisation of Palestine. Firstly, Said (1979) argued that Orientals were not seen as people, or as citizens of a state but as “problems to be solved or confined” (Said, 1979. p.233). This mirrors the colonial and dehumanising language we hear from world leaders and institutions today when discussing the colonisation of Palestine. According to the UN itself: “In 1947 the UK turned the ‘Palestine problem’ over to the UN”, this statement is included on a page which the UN has titled “The Question of Palestine” (UN, 2025). By referring to Palestine as a ‘question’ or a ‘problem’, the liberal institution whose sole aim it is to “maintain international peace and security” (UN Charter, 2025) is itself engaging in the colonial dehumanisation that Said (1979) described.

Furthermore, the UN also claims to protect “the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples” (UN, 2025) however, to pose the struggle for Palestinian self-determination as a question or problem shows not only a glaring disparity in the application of these protections of rights but also highlights how postcolonial theory allows us to effectively critique the liberal order in a way which other theories do not. Said’s (1979) criticism of this framing of the Orient as a problem for the West to solve is just as accurate in contemporary international relations as it was at the time of his writing.

Secondly, Said (1979) argued that Arabs are portrayed as a monolith rather than individuals, he observed that Western media images portrayed Arab populations as representations of “mass rage and misery” (Said, 1979 p.312) he also argued that this is intentional and that this construction is due to what he terms “the menace of Jihad” (Said, 1979. p.312). This is the orientalist idea that Muslims or Arabs will attempt some form of global domination through terrorism and is fundamental to understanding the representation of Palestinian resistance factions by Western governments. In 2023, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu claimed in a statement “Hamas is ISIS and ISIS is Hamas” (Netanyahu, 2023). This false equivalence between Palestinian national resistance groups and groups such as ISIS not only misses fundamental differences between the two actors but serves as an ideological tool to further delegitimise the struggle for Palestinian self-determination.

Whilst both groups can be fairly regarded as Islamic (which carries its own orientalist connotations) ISIS is a transnational group with a globalist agenda aimed at uniting Muslims under a single caliphate governed by Sharia-based law (Krause, 2023). In contrast, Hamas is focused on the liberation of Palestine and has only ever pursued nationalistic goals to that end, it has never operated out with the territory of historic Palestine and unlike ISIS, is focused solely on Palestinian liberation as an end goal (Krause, 2023). Furthermore, ISIS regards democracy as a concept to be in direct contradiction to Islam and considers it to be a Western import, whereas Hamas has participated in legislative elections within the Palestinian territories and even held a power-sharing agreement with Fatah, its secular political rivals (Krause, 2023). Despite the demonstrable differences between the groups, Said’s (1979) observations on “the menace of Jihad” (Said, 1979. p.312) are still as accurate today given the political alienation of Palestinian resistance factions by the international community under the guise of anti-terrorism legislation.

The failure of Western governments to engage with Hamas is yet another roadblock in the path to Palestinian self-determination. Hamas is a “political organisation embedded within a wider social movement [rather than] a purely paramilitary organisation” (Gunning, 2009, p.180). Furthermore, Gunning (2009) argues that to study Hamas’ engagement in violence as if it was an isolated resistance group without political ambitions would be dismissive of its aims within domestic Palestinian politics. Despite this, the reductionist idea of describing Palestinian resistance purely as Islamic terrorism is all too common with multiple world leaders perpetuating the false equivalence stated by Benjamin Netanyahu. In this context, the unwillingness of the international community to engage with Hamas is a form of political blacklisting based on orientalist tropes rather than empirical evidence, which ultimately serves to reinforce colonial legitimacy and delegitimise armed struggle to colonisation.

Conclusion/Policy Suggestion

The framing of Palestinian armed resistance as terrorism is a predominantly Western concept; globally only a minority of countries recognise Hamas as a terrorist organisation. This includes the UK, the US and the EU amongst other Western allies. Hamas itself has appealed its EU proscription multiple times on the basis that it does not conform to the EU description of terrorism with an initially successful appeal being later overturned (Abdullah, 2020). Furthermore, The UNGA in resolution 38/17 reaffirms the legitimate struggle for liberation from colonial occupation “by all available means, including armed struggle” (UN, 1983) which, whilst this resolution does not legitimise specific acts of resistance, it does legitimise the struggle for liberation outwith the parameters of non-violent struggle. From a postcolonial perspective, the only viable route to peace in Palestine is through decolonisation and if Fanon’s (1963) argument is to be accepted, the Palestinian resistance should be at the forefront of that process. Given Hamas already possesses distinct political and military wings, it would be possible for the international community to engage with Hamas as a political entity if it desired.

Therefore, the policy suggestion of this paper is directed to the UN Secretary General and recommends that multilateral international engagement with Hamas and other resistance factions must be brought to the agenda if any meaningful progress is to be made towards decolonisation.

Unfortunately, the likelihood of this occurring within the current international system is extremely small. This is due to the dominance of existing hegemonic powers and their continued support for Israel, a support shaped in part by its alignment with Western interests. This dynamic illustrates the power imbalances which postcolonial theorists aim to expose. The persistence of imperial legacies, colonial structures, and racialised hierarchies within contemporary international relations emphasises the need to refine and advance postcolonial political theory as a timelessly relevant and intellectually honest analytical tool.

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